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CIRI-CIRI JAWATANKUASA AUDIT DAN KUALITI AKAUN KEWANGAN 
TIDAK DIAUDIT 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Pelaporan kewangan digunakan di dalam proses membuat keputusan ekonomi. 
Dengan itu, adalah perlu bagi pelaporan kewangan menyediakan maklumat kewangan 
yang benar. Pada masa yang sama, jawatankuasa audit ditugaskan untuk menyemak 
akaun kewangan dan diharap dapat memastikan ketepatan akaun kewangan. Oleh itu, 
selain daripada memeriksa kewujudan variasi antara keuntungan di dalam akaun 
kewangan tahunan yang tidak diaudit dan yang diaudit, kajian ini juga memeriksa 
kesan ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit terhadap kewujudan variasi tersebut. 
 
Dengan menggunakan sampel sebanyak 261 syarikat tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia 
pada tahun 2004, analisa menunjukkan 64-peratus syarikat mempunyai variasi di 
dalam akaun kewangan yang dilaporkan oleh mereka. Kewujudan variasi ini 
menimbulkan persoalan terhadap kualiti akaun suku tahunan yang dikeluarkan oleh 
syarikat-syarikat terbabit. Keputusan analisa juga menunjukkan kesan ciri-ciri 
jawatankuasa audit terhadap variasi, di mana jawatankuasa audit yang mempunyai 
purata bilangan ahli yang menjadi pengarah di syarikat yang lain yang lebih banyak 
dan mempunyai lebih ramai bilangan ahli, mempunyai hubung kait dengan akaun 
kewangan yang tiada variasi. Keputusan ini meningkatkan lagi literasi kajian terhadap 
hubungan antara ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit dan kualiti pelaporan kewangan. 
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AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS AND QUALITY OF UNAUDITED 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Since financial reporting is widely used in the process of making economic decision, it 
is vital for financial reporting to provide the truthfulness of information. Meanwhile, an 
audit committee which is discharged with the responsibility in reviewing the financial 
accounts is expected to ensure the accuracy of these financial accounts. Thus, besides 
of just examining the occurrences of variations between earnings in unaudited year-
end financial account and audited annual account, this study also examines the effects 
of audit committee characteristics on these variations. 
 
By using 261 sample companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia in 2004, it was found that 
64-percent of companies do have variations in their financial accounts. The 
occurrences of these variations have raised questions regarding the quality of quarterly 
accounts produced. The results of the multivariate analysis provide support for the 
effect of audit committee characteristics on earnings variations, whereby audit 
committees with greater number of average directorship holdings in other companies 
and a higher number of members were found to be positively associated with non-
variations financial accounts. These results add to the growing literature on the 
relationship between audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
With the occurrence of the East Asian financial crisis in the mid-year of 1997, together 
with the corporate scandal involving Enron, the seventh largest company in the United 
States (during that time) and TRI Berhad in Malaysia, suggest the need for a better 
practice of corporate governance in the corporate world today. Corporate governance 
is a set of mechanisms adopted in order to ensure that directors and managers make 
decisions and act in the best interests of the stakeholders (Gillian and Starks, 1998; 
Lashgari, 2004; Thillainathan, 1999). Recently, the government has taken steps to 
review and strengthen the corporate governance in Malaysia where in 1998, the 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) was established to enhance the 
practice of corporate governance in the country. One of its main responsibilities was to 
develop guidelines on good practices for companies as other advanced countries 
around the world. In March 2000, the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 
formed by the MICG has released the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
which was aimed at providing guidelines on structures and processes that companies 
can use to observe good corporate governance in their business practices. Initially, the 
Code was introduced as a voluntary requirement for companies to use as a guide to 
ensure and enhance corporate governance. However, by January 2001, it was made 
mandatory for companies to adapt the Code in order to create an environment that 
demands higher standards of conduct and higher quality of disclosures from public 
listed companies and their board of directors.  
 
A few authorities have also introduced certain requirements in promoting good 
corporate governance. For example, the Companies Commission of Malaysia had 
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launched the Malaysian Directors’ Code of Ethics, which is applicable to all 
corporations including unlisted companies. Besides that, the government also initiated 
the establishment of the Minority Shareholders Watchdogs Group to encourage 
shareholders’ active participation and help raise corporate governance standards. In 
2001, the Bursa Malaysia, [formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE)], has revamped the Main Board and Second Board listing requirement with the 
objectives to enhance corporate governance and transparency, enhance efficiency in 
capital market activities and strengthen and promote investors’ confidence. This new 
listing requirement is one rule book that is applicable to both Main Board and Second 
Board companies.  
  
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Audit Committee 
 
In the corporate structure, there are two different parties involved; the management 
and the providers of funds, and therefore potential conflicts of interest among these 
participants may arise (Gillian and Starks, 1998). These conflicts of interest, often 
referred to as agency problem, arises from two main sources; different participants 
have different goals and preferences; and the participants have imperfect information 
as to each others’ actions, knowledge and preferences (Gillian and Starks, 1998). Audit 
committee is one mechanism available to the board of directors to limit conflicts of 
interest between managers and stockholders (Menon and William, 1994). With the 
wide adoption for the formation of audit committees around the world suggests the 
importance of an audit committee as a governance mechanism. “The evolution of audit 
committees in the corporate environment can be divided into four phases: voluntary 
establishment of audit committee; mandatory establishment of audit committee; 
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functions and effectiveness of audit committee; and strengthening the effectiveness of 
audit committee” (Kuppusamy, Nazim and Shanmugam, 2003, p.514).  
 
The debate on the need for better corporate governance in Malaysia had actually 
began to be highlighted much earlier following the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Limited 
(BMF) scandal in mid-1982 causing a loss of RM 2.5 billion (see for example Ling, 
1992). BMF, a subsidiary of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Berhad (BBMB) at that 
time, was a license-deposit-taking in Hong Kong. The nearly collapsed of BBMB, the 
largest domestic bank in the country at that time, could be said as the start of the audit 
committee development in Malaysia (Abdullah and Al-Murisi, 1997). In 1985, the Bank 
Negara required all financial institutions under its supervision to have an audit 
committee to be chaired by a non-executive director. The requirements were made 
clear through the “BNM/GP1 – Guideline on Duties and Responsibilities of Directors 
and Appointment of Chief Executives” which was issued on 1st November 1985. 
Responsibilities were placed on the board of directors of financial institutions to 
establish audit committees through Section 2(ii) of the guideline which states that the 
board must “establish an audit and examination Committee of Directors comprising of 
non-executive directors”.  
 
However, the mandatory requirement for the formation of audit committee for listed 
companies in Malaysia came much later in 1993 when the Bursa Malaysia made 
amendments to their Listing Requirements by introducing a provision in Section 344A 
requiring the establishment of audit committees for companies listed on Bursa Malaysia 
effective from 1st September 1993. A period of one-year (1994) was given for the 
companies to comply with this requirement. Under this requirement, an audit committee 
must be composed of no fewer than three (3) members comprising a majority of non-
executive directors and the audit committee members shall elect a chairman among 
them who shall be a non-executive director. The extent to which this mandatory 
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formation was complied can be seen in Table 1.1 of this study. The survey shows that 
in 1993 only 17 percent of the sampled Main Board companies and 5 percent of the 
sampled Second Board companies had formed audit committees. However, a year 
later an increase to 56 percent of Main Board companies and 24 percent of Second 
Board companies had formed their audit committees. All the sampled companies had 
formed their audit committees only by 1998. 
 
Table 1.1  
Formation Of Audit Committees In Listed Firms In Malaysia 
 
 
 
Year 
Main Board Second Board 
Frequency of 
Audit 
Committees 
formation 
Total 
listed 
firms 
% over 
listed 
firms 
% over 
  total 
sample 
Frequency 
of Audit 
Committees 
formation 
Total 
listed 
firms 
% over 
listed 
firms 
% over 
total 
sample 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
       0 
        1 
       56 
       187 
       27 
       28 
       30 
       6 
 292 
 317 
 329 
 347 
 369 
 413 
 444 
 454 
   0.0 
   0.3 
   17.0 
   53.9 
   7.3 
   6.8 
   6.8 
   1.3
   0.0 
   0.3 
   16.7 
   55.8 
   8.1 
   8.4 
   9.0 
   1.8
       0 
       0 
       10 
       54 
       36 
       43 
       51 
       27
 32 
 52 
 84 
 131 
 160 
 208 
 264 
 282 
   0.0 
   0.0 
   11.9 
   41.2 
   22.5 
   20.7 
   19.3 
   9.6
   0.0
   0.0
   4.5
   24.4
   16.3
   19.5
   23.1
   12.2
Total        335      100        221      100.0
Source: Sori, Mohamad & Hamid (2001). 
 
Changes were also made on audit committee composition under the revamping of the 
Listing Requirement, where alternate directors were not permitted to be appointed as a 
member of the audit committee and one of the members of the audit committee must 
be a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) or if he/she is a non-
member, he/she must have at least three (3) years working experience and further 
have passed the examinations specified in Part I of the 1st Schedule of the 
Accountants Act 1967 or a member of one of the associations of accountants specified 
in Part II of the 1st Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967. 
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1.1.1(a)  The Roles of Audit Committee 
 
With the rapid growth in the Malaysian economy, especially with the privatization of the 
nation’s postal, telecommunication, power and sewerage treatment operations, the 
business environment and laws are becoming more complex and these have created a 
greater demand for an acceptable level of corporate behavior, not lacking from 
professionalism and credibility, to uphold good corporate integrity (CheAhmad, 2001). 
Hence, with the wide adoption of the audit committee arguably suggests that the audit 
committee is an important element of the system of corporate governance.  
 
The audit committee is a committee of the board of directors, which assumes some of 
the board’s responsibilities (Menon and Williams, 1994). As widely recognized, the 
duties of the audit committees have been related to internal audit (see for example 
Raghunandan, Read and Rama, 2001), financial reporting (see for example McMullen 
and Raghunandan, 1996; Read and Raghunandan, 2001; Song and Windram, 2000), 
and external auditor (see for example Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Carcello and 
Neal, 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2003; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). These three 
interrelated duties are discharged to audit committees to ensure that financial 
statements and external filings fairly represent the financial results of the company and 
to enable independent verification of the efficiency of systems and controls (Atkins, 
2002). In Malaysia, the mandated functions of an audit committee which are based 
upon the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (2001) also cover 
these three aspects. Under Chapter 15.13 of the Listing Requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia Securities Berhad (2001), the committee is discharged with the function of 
reviewing and reporting to the board of directors the following: 
a) the external auditor audit plan, his evaluation of the internal control system, his 
audit report and assistance given by the employees of the company, 
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b) the adequacy of the scope, functions and resources of the internal audit 
functions and that it has the necessary authority to carry out its work, 
c) the internal audit program, processes, the results of the internal audit program, 
processes or investigation undertaken and whether or not appropriate action is 
taken on the recommendations of the internal audit functions, 
d) the quarterly results and year-end financial statements, 
e) any related party transactions and situations regarding conflicts of interest, 
f) any letter of resignation from the external auditors, and 
g) whether there is a reason to believe that the external auditor is not suitable for 
re-appointment. 
Besides that, the audit committee also plays a role in recommending the nomination of 
external auditors.  
 
1.1.2 Financial Reporting 
 
Financial reporting is an important element of the system of corporate governance and 
some failures of corporate governance may therefore be due to inadequate financial 
reports (Whittington, 1993). This is because, the financial reporting serves as the main 
means of communication between companies and stakeholders by relieving 
fundamental asymmetry information between the directors, who have access to 
management information, and providers of finance who are external to the company 
(Whittington, 1993). Published corporate annual reports are one of the many forms of 
accounting reports made available to third parties and probably the most common and 
well-known form (Stone, 1967).  
 
Accounting data clearly furnishes one type of quantitative data that can be used as a 
basis for making some of the choices that have to be made from among the 
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alternatives available and for checking and evaluating progress and results (Stone, 
1967). Audited financial statements also provide a common ground for investors to 
compare firms within or across time periods (Hodge, 2001). Therefore, financial 
reporting is a crucial link in enabling providers of finance to monitor directors 
(Whittington, 1993) and therefore help them to make economic decisions (Razman and 
Iskandar, 2003).  
 
However, with the widespread manifestation of fraudulent or misleading financial 
reporting in the most recent spate of corporate disasters, have given impetus to 
inquiries concerned with the integrity of the financial reporting process, the 
responsibilities of those involved in it and the truthfulness of financial statements 
(Wolnizer, 1995). This is because the credibility and transparency of financial reporting 
of a company depends on the monitoring mechanism of that company (Fama, 1980). 
 
In Malaysia, under the Malaysian Companies Act 1965, every company registered 
under the Act is required to produce financial accounts for every financial year. The Act 
also requires that this annually financial account be audited by an external independent 
auditor referred as the approved company auditor. An audited financial statement 
increases the reliability of financial information for users which is necessary if 
managers, investors, creditors and regulatory agencies are to make informed decisions 
about resource allocation (Messier and Boh, 2002). Therefore, by adding the audit 
function by an external independent auditor in the business environment, the users of 
the financial statements have reasonable assurance that the financial statements do 
not contain material misstatements or omissions and shall enhance the credibility of the 
audit report (Messier and Boh, 2002). The auditor’s report, which accompanies the 
financial statements, attests to the truth and fairness of such statements and in doing 
so provides a degree of assurance to users of the financial statements that the 
statements are free of material misstatements (Ismail and Iskandar, 2003). In addition 
 8
to this, under Chapter 9.23 of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad (2001), listed companies are also required to produce their annual audited 
accounts no later than four (4) months by the end of their financial year and their 
annual reports no later than six (6) months by the end of their financial year. 
 
In Malaysia, besides having required to comply with the Companies Act 1965, listed 
companies are also required to comply with the Listing Requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia Securities Berhad (2001), where under Chapter 9.22 of the Listing 
Requirement, all listed companies are required to produce quarterly financial accounts. 
The purpose of this requirement is so that shareholders can be informed more regularly 
(without having to wait for the companies’ annual audited accounts) and therefore, will 
enable the shareholders to monitor the performance of companies on a regular basis. 
In addition to this, the requirement also states that all listed companies are required to 
produce this report no later than two (2) months by the end of each quarter of their 
financial year. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Since the Enron Corporation’s scandal in 2001 in the United States, there have been 
consistent moves for better quality and consistency of accounting and accurate 
reporting to protect the interest of the stakeholders (see for example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act introduced in the United States in 2001). This is because financial reporting 
is an important element in the corporate structure, by relieving a fundamental 
asymmetry information between managers/directors and providers of finance 
(Whittington, 1993). The limited access to managerial information causes the providers 
of finance such as shareholders and debtholders, to be forced to rely on the financial 
reporting. 
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As financial reporting provides value-relevant information to the external parties of the 
organization, the heavy reliance placed on accounting numbers create powerful 
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings to their own advantage (Rahman and 
Ali, 2006). Hence, it is important for the financial accounts to provide the truthfulness/ 
accuracy of financial information to enable the shareholders to make decisions wisely. 
The lack of accuracy in the financial results will lead to the shareholders’ making wrong 
judgments concerning their decisions.  
 
As noted earlier in the previous sub-section, besides having required to produce annual 
audited accounts, listed companies are also required to produce quarterly accounts. 
However, since the nature of quarterly accounts which are not generally audited and 
contain less disclosure as compared to annual audited accounts, the quality and 
reliability of these accounts have raised concerns (Yang and Krishnan, 2005). Thus, 
due to the nature of these accounts, managers may be more able to manage quarterly 
accounts as opposed to annual accounts (Yang and Krishnan, 2005) and may have 
relatively more latitude to manipulate the quarterly numbers than annual numbers 
(Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999). Besides that, the issues related to inaccuracy of 
quarterly accounts have also raised the concern of the Bursa Malaysia, where a 
requirement was mandated for companies with variations between profit after tax and 
minority interest (PATMI) in unaudited year-end quarterly account and audited annual 
account of 10 percent and more, to make immediate announcements concerning the 
variations and a complete explanation of the deviation to the Bursa Malaysia [Chapter 
9.19(34) of Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (2001)]. 
 
The concerns regarding the quality of financial reporting have raised questions 
regarding the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism of a company. Fama (1980) 
suggests that the credibility and transparency of financial reporting of a company 
depends upon the monitoring mechanism of the company itself. Effective corporate 
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governance mechanisms safeguard the rights of investors in getting true and fair 
information of the company (Rahman and Ali, 2006). One high-level governance 
device, which has been discharged in ensuring the quality of financial reporting, is the 
audit committee. This is because board of directors often delegates the responsibility 
for oversight of the financial statement reporting process to an audit committee 
(Beasley, 1996). In Malaysia, whether the audit committee should be formed or not is 
no longer a relevant issue since it has been strongly answered in affirmative: Chapter 
15 of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (2001). What has 
been an issue of greater interest among academicians, investors and regulatory bodies 
are the effectiveness of audit committees in performing their functions. This is due to 
the fact that even though the formation of an audit committee is mandatory in Malaysia, 
their effectiveness as a governance mechanism may still be questionable. Moreover, 
from studies conducted in other countries, there have been sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the presence of an audit committee alone does not assure that the 
committee will perform their duties as expected (see for example Beasley, 1996; Collier 
and Gregory, 1996), where the formation of audit committees were said to be for 
cosmetic purposes (Menon and William, 1994) and as a training ground for new 
directors (Vafeas, 2001).  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The situations as stated above, together with the arising issues on the quality of 
quarterly accounts and the effectiveness of audit committees in reviewing them lead to 
the following research questions: 
1. Are quarterly financial accounts produced by companies reliable (in 
terms of their accuracy)? 
2. Are audit committees effective in reviewing the quarterly accounts 
produced by companies?  
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3. Do the characteristics of audit committee have an effect on the accuracy 
of quarterly accounts? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
Based upon the problem statement and research questions stated in the earlier 
subsections, the objectives of this study can be categorized into two main objectives. 
Firstly, since the variations between profit after tax and minority interest (PATMI) in 
unaudited year-end quarterly account and audited annual account by listed companies 
in the Bursa Malaysia has never been examined in prior studies conducted (to the 
author’s knowledge), therefore this study attempts to examine the occurrence of this 
variations. Besides that, this study also tries to examine whether the characteristics of 
audit committees have an effect on the variations. Specifically, the study attempts to 
examine: 
1. the occurrence of variations between profit after tax and minority interest 
(PATMI) in unaudited year-end quarterly account and audited annual 
account by listed companies in the Bursa Malaysia; 
2. the differences in the characteristics of audit committee between 
companies producing an accurate unaudited year-end quarterly account 
and an inaccurate unaudited year-end quarterly account; 
3.  the relationship between the characteristics of an audit committee and 
accuracy of unaudited year-end quarterly account. 
 
1.5  Significance of the Study 
 
Consistent with recent studies done on the quality of financial reporting (see for 
example Guan, He and Yang, 2006; Yang and Krishnan, 2005) this study will also be 
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focusing on quarterly financial accounts. This is relevant because fraudulent financial 
reporting often begins with quarterly misstatements (Yang and Krishnan, 2005) and 
thus, by examining the factors associated with the quality of quarterly accounts, could 
therefore enhance the quality of annual accounts. In addition to this, since no previous 
studies (as yet) has been conducted to examine the variations between profit after tax 
and minority interest in unaudited year-end quarterly account and audited annual 
account, especially those done in Malaysia, this study could be beneficial in exploring 
this issue. Besides that, even though the mandatory requirement for the formation of 
audit committees in Malaysia has been mandated since 1993, there is still lack of 
empirical evidence in studies regarding the effectiveness of audit committees 
conducted in Malaysia (see for example Abdullah and Al-Murisi, 1997; Razman and 
Iskandar, 2003). Moreover, even though some of the earlier studies have indicated that 
the characteristics of audit committees can contribute to their effectiveness in ensuring 
the compliance of a company’s financial reporting with the regulatory requirements and 
accounting or auditing standards (Abbott, Park and Parker, 2000; Beasley, 1996; 
McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Song and Windram, 2004), ensuring the accuracy 
of annual audited accounts (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004; McMullen and 
Raghunandan, 1996), limiting the manipulation of accrual accounting treatment 
(Davidson, Stewart and Kent, 2005; Klein, 2002b; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt, 2002; Yang and Krishnan, 2005)  and increasing disclosure 
practices (Alsaeed, 2006; Craig and Diga, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), the 
effectiveness of audit committees in ensuring the accuracy of unaudited year-end 
quarterly accounts may still be questionable. Therefore, findings from this study could 
be beneficial in exploring and understanding the characteristics of an effective audit 
committee which could then benefit several parties such as regulatory bodies, board of 
directors and shareholders in enhancing the effectiveness of their audit committees.  
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1.6      Organization of Remaining Chapters 
 
This chapter discusses the background of audit committees and financial reporting. It is 
then followed by a discussion on problem statement, research questions and objectives 
and the significance of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on financial 
reporting and audit committees, followed by the development of theoretical rationale 
and hypotheses to be tested. This is followed by a discussion of the research design, 
variables measurements and sample selection in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses the 
results of analyses conducted in this study and Chapter 5 discusses the findings, 
limitation, implication and the conclusion of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with the review of studies on financial reporting and audit 
committees. The chapter then develops the theoretical rationale to relate audit 
committees with variations between profit after tax and minority interest (PATMI) in 
unaudited year-end quarterly account and audited annual account and the hypotheses 
that will be tested in the study. 
 
2.1 Financial Reporting 
 
The quality of financial reporting has always been an issue of interest among regulatory 
bodies, shareholders, researchers and the accounting profession itself. This is due to 
the fact that financial reporting has been a principle means of communicating financial 
information to outside users (Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds, 2002) and the use of 
financial reporting itself in assessing the economic performance and condition of a 
business, in the quest to monitor management’s actions and assists in making 
economic decisions (Warren and Reeve, 2004). Lev and Ohlson (1982) have 
contended that financial information has a dual role in the capital market which aids in 
establishing a set of equilibrium share prices that affects the allocation of resources 
and the production decisions implemented by companies and enables individuals to 
exchange claims to present and future consumption and the sharing of social risks. The 
use and usefulness of financial accounts to the market participants in estimating a 
company’s value has been proven by previous studies. Markets have shown to react to 
the annual audited accounts (see for example Cheung and Sami, 2000; Eddy and 
Seifert, 1992; Isa and Subramaniam, 2000) and quarterly accounts (see for example 
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Hsieh, Jerris and Kross, 1999; Kross and Schroeder, 1990; Lee and Park, 2000) 
produced by companies. They have also shown that markets react positively to 
favorable earnings and react negatively to unfavorable earnings in the financial 
accounts. As it provides value-relevant information to external parties of the 
organization, the heavy reliance placed on accounting numbers create powerful 
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings to their own advantage (Rahman and 
Ali, 2006). Therefore, since the nature of quarterly accounts which are not generally 
audited and contain less disclosure as compared to annual audited accounts, many 
have concerns on their quality (Yang and Krishnan, 2005). This is because, due to this 
nature, managers may be more able to manage quarterly accounts as opposed to 
annual accounts (Yang and Krishnan, 2005) and may have relatively more latitude to 
manipulate the quarterly numbers than annual numbers (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999). 
Furthermore, a recent study by Guan, He and Yang (2006) had shown that companies 
tend to engage in cosmetic earnings management in each of the four fiscal quarters. 
They also found that the degree of cosmetic earnings management is significantly less 
severe in the fourth fiscal quarter, which is the only quarter audited, than any of the 
other quarters. 
 
Besides the markets (shareholder), the users of financial reporting information include 
customers, suppliers, government, lenders, employees, competitors, managers, 
community representatives and investment analysts (Atrill and McLaney, 2001). Since 
the financial reports are prepared to meet the varying and potentially conflicting needs 
of all user groups, the financial reporting should be adaptive to the needs of all 
interested parties. Atrill and McLaney (2001) outlined certain key criterias that should 
be owned by the financial reporting in order to meet the needs of users which are 
identified as relevance, reliability, comparability, understandability, timeliness and 
cost/benefit. They also claimed that the relevance and reliability of the financial 
reporting can help to produce useful information but the lack of comparability, 
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understandability, timelines and cost/benefit on getting the information in turn will limit 
its usefulness.  
 
2.1.1  Proxies for Quality Financial Reporting 
 
Several determinants have been used by previous researchers as proxies for quality 
financial reporting in their studies. Among the proxies that have been used are the 
compliance with accounting or auditing standards (Abbott, Park and Parker, 2000; 
Beasley, 1996; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Song and Windram, 2004), 
accuracy of accounts (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004; McMullen and Raghunandan, 
1996), manipulation of accounting treatments (Davidson, Stewart and Kent, 2005; 
Klein, 2002b; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2002; Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005) and disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006; Craig and Diga, 1998; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002).  
 
Most of the earlier studies have used the compliance of financial reporting with 
accounting and auditing standards as a proxy for quality financial reporting. Motivated 
by earlier studies by Beasley (1996) who had used a sample of companies that were 
subject to regulatory enforcements as a proxy for low quality financial reporting, later 
studies by Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) and Song and Windram (2004) have 
replicated this approach. Besides that, since the need to restate financial accounts is 
only required if material information is misstated or omitted (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 
2004), McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) also included companies that have restated 
their financial accounts into their sample. A recent study by Abbott, Parker and Peters 
(2004) had also used restatement of financial reporting as a proxy for low financial 
reporting quality in their study. In addition to this, based on the argument that even 
though the manipulation of accruals accounting is being done not in violation of the 
accounting standards but it may lead to inaccurate information (Rahman and Ali, 2006), 
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past researchers have also used accruals accounting manipulation as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality in their studies. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2002), Klein 
(2002b), Yang and Krishnan (2005), Davidson, Stewart and Kent (2005), Rahman and 
Ali (2006) had implemented the level of accruals as a proxy for their financial reporting 
quality, whereby companies with higher level of accruals are identified as having low 
quality financial accounts and vice versa. On the other hand, studies by Craig and Diga 
(1998), Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Alsaeed (2006) had used the level of voluntary 
disclosures as their proxy for quality financial reporting. This is based on the argument 
that since there is inadequacy of compulsory information, the voluntary disclosures 
provide investors with necessary information to make more informed decisions 
(Alsaeed, 2006). While earlier studies have concentrated on the annual financial 
reporting, various concerns on quality financial reporting have recently been focused 
on quarterly reports (see for example Yang and Krishnan, 2005).  
 
2.1.2  Factors Affecting Financial Reporting Quality 
 
Besides of just determining the appropriate proxy to be used to represent the quality of 
financial reporting, previous studies have also examined the factors that effect financial 
reporting quality. One of the most arguable factor is the monitoring mechanism of the 
company. Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that the credibility and transparency 
of financial reporting of a company depends on the effectiveness of the monitoring 
mechanism of the company itself, hence have led researchers to examine the effects of 
several monitoring mechanisms such as board of directors, audit committees, internal 
audit and external audit to the financial reporting quality. 
 
Since the board of directors receives its authority for internal control and other 
decisions from stockholders of corporations (Beasley, 1996), Fama and Jensen (1983) 
claimed that the highest internal control and monitoring mechanism is the board of 
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directors. Based on this contention, researchers have argued that board of directors 
has an effect on the quality of financial reporting. They hypothesized that, to perform 
effectively as a monitoring mechanism, the board of directors should be structured 
properly by considering its independency and optimum number of members.  
 
The independence of board of directors has been widely argued by researchers to 
have an effect on the financial reporting quality. This is to ensure that, the board is not 
to collude with top management and therefore increase their ability to monitor top 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, by using several variables, prior 
research have examined whether board independence has an effect on the financial 
reporting quality. One of the most arguable factor is the inclusion of independent 
directors on the board. This is based on the argument that outside directors have 
incentives to carryout their monitoring tasks and not to collude with top management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Studies by Davidson, Stewart and Kent (2005) and (Klein, 
2002b) had found support for this argument whereby their analyses have shown a 
significant negative relationship between the board that is comprised of a majority of 
non-executive directors and accruals. Furthermore, studies by Song and Windram 
(2004) and Beasley (1996) have also found a significant negative relationship between 
board independence and financial statement fraud. However, Rahman and Ali (2006) 
did not find any significant relationship between the percentage of independent 
directors on the board and discretionary accruals. Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) 
also did not find any significant relationship between the percentage of outside 
directors and restatement of financial statements.  
 
Besides the inclusion of independent directors on the board, researchers have also 
highlighted the importance of having the separation between board chair and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). They argued that the appointment of a CEO to the position of 
chair can lead to a concentration of power (Beasley, 1996) and possible conflicts of 
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interest, resulting in a reduction in the level of monitoring (Davidson, Stewart and Kent, 
2005). Centralization of control in the hands of CEO will result in the CEO with too 
much power (Rahman and Ali, 2006)  and gives the CEO the ability to override the 
firm’s internal control structure (Abbott, Park and Parker, 2000). Prior studies have 
found mixed evidence for this contention. A study by Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) 
indicated that the combination of board chair and CEO position is positively related with 
financial statement fraud, however, Beasley (1996) had found it to be insignificant. 
Meanwhile, findings from Rahman and Ali (2006) indicated a significant negative 
relationship between companies separating the board chair and CEO and accruals 
which Davidson, Stewart and Kent (2005) failed to show their significance. A study by 
Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) also did not find any support for the relationship with 
financial restatements. 
 
Related to the size of board of directors, Song and Windram (2004) have argued that a 
larger board may create a diminished sense of individual responsibility and could 
undermine its effectiveness. On the other hand, Rahman and Ali (2006) postulated that 
large board members with varied expertise could increase the synergetic monitoring of 
the board. However, findings from previous studies have shown that the number of 
members on the board of directors has a negative impact on the financial reporting 
quality, whereby board size has been found to be positively significant with the level of 
discretionary accruals (Rahman and Ali, 2006), financial restatements (Abbott, Parker 
and Peter, 2004) and positively related to financial fraud companies (Song and 
Windram, 2004). 
 
However, with the formation of an audit committee, which has been discharged with the 
responsibility of monitoring the financial reporting on behalf of the board of directors, 
have led researchers to examine the effect of the audit committee to the financial 
reporting quality (see for example Beasley, 1996; McMullen, 1996). However, there has 
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been inconsistency in the findings related to the existence of audit committee and the 
quality of financial reporting (see for example, Beasley, 1996; McMullen, 1996).  This 
inconsistency may be due to the differences in the level of effectiveness of audit 
committees between different companies. Therefore, recent studies have argued that 
the characteristics of an audit committee have a greater deal of influence towards the 
effectiveness of the audit committee itself in monitoring the financial reporting process 
(see for example Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004; Song and Windram, 2004). 
 
Besides that, researchers have also argued that the quality of an external auditor as an 
important factor effecting financial reporting quality, whereby a high quality external 
auditor is expected to have an influence on the quality of financial reporting. Given the 
existence of information asymmetries and the potential conflicts of interest between 
company management and outside users of financial information, an audit of financial 
reports by third party can enhance the quality of the financial information reported by 
management because a high quality auditor is more likely to detect questionable 
accounting practices and to a certain extent may compel management to follow 
accounting practices as prescribed by the accounting standards (Rahman and Ali, 
2006). However, prior studies have failed to prove this contention. By using a proxy of 
brand name auditor as provider of higher quality audit, Davidson, Stewart and Kent 
(2005) did not find any significant relationship with the level of discretionary accruals 
and Alsaeed (2006) did not find any significant relationship with the level of voluntary 
disclosures.  
 
Another argument postulated was that the presence of an internal audit function could 
enhance the quality of financial reporting. The voluntarily establishment of an internal 
audit function provides supplement to a company’s existing internal governance 
framework (Davidson, Stewart and Kent, 2005) by functioning both as monitor and 
advisor to the company (Brody and Lowe, 2000). The establishment of an internal audit 
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is beneficial in assisting the audit committee (Scarbrough, Rama and Ragunandhan, 
1998) and the external auditor in discharging their duties and as an internal safeguard, 
the internal auditor is one vehicle mechanism in identifying, controlling and detecting 
the existence or attempting of misappropriating financial reporting information. 
However, a study by Davidson, Stewart and Kent (2005) failed to prove its significance 
relationship with the level of discretionary accruals.  
 
Besides monitoring mechanisms, researchers have also argued the effects of other 
firm characteristics on the quality of financial reporting. Among the firm characteristics 
variables that have been widely discussed by previous researchers are firm assets, 
firm age, firm profitability and firm debt. 
 
One of the most arguable firm characteristics which has an effect on financial reporting 
quality is firm asset (size). Since large companies are more exposed to public scrutiny 
(Alsaeed, 2006) and are more complex (Craig and Diga, 1998), than smaller 
companies, they need to provide better quality of financial reporting. Besides that, large 
companies also have greater resources and may be able to appoint prestigious 
external auditors and attract reputable non-executive directors (Song and Windram, 
2004), which in turn could help them in enhancing the quality of financial reporting and 
at the same time posses sufficient resources for collecting, analyzing and presenting 
extensive amount of data at minimal costs (Alsaeed, 2006). Evidence from previous 
studies have shown that the size of company assets was significantly positively 
associated with the level of disclosures (Alsaeed, 2006; Craig and Diga, 1998) and 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004; 
Davidson, Stewart and Kent, 2005; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Yang and Krishnan, 2005).  
 
On the other hand, changes in the level of asset have also been argued to have an 
adverse effect on the quality of financial reporting. Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) had 
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argued that the increase in firm assets cause inadequacy of financial controls and 
create the management incentives to mask downturns and thus will increase the 
likelihood of financial misstatements. In their study, Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) had 
found evidence that asset growth as having a positively significant relationship with 
firms sanctioned for fraudulent reporting. However, Beasley (1996) failed to find any 
significant relationship with financial account fraud and another study by Abbott, Parker 
and Peters (2004) also failed to show any significant relationship with financial account 
restatement.  
 
Besides that, a company’s profitability has also been argued to have an influence on 
the quality of financial reporting. Alsaeed (2006) argued that a profitable firm may feel 
proud of its achievements and therefore would wish to disclose more information to the 
public in order to promote positive impressions of its performance. However, even 
though a study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) did find a significant positive relationship 
between return on equity (ROE) with voluntary disclosure, a study by Alsaeed (2006) 
on the other hand, had found insignificant relationships. Besides that, the level of profit 
has also been argued to have an influence on the manipulation of accounting accruals 
because managers may manage earnings to increase their bonus rewards (Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005). However, Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Rahman and Ali (2006) did 
not find any significant relationships between the level of net income and discretionary 
accruals. This inconsistency and insignificant in the results is probably due to the use 
of current profitability, instead of changes in profits. Therefore, studies by Klein (2002b) 
and Davidson, Stewart and Kent (2005) have argued that the changes in profit 
influence the manipulation of accounting accruals. Both of the studies have found 
support for this argument whereby their studies indicated a significant positive 
relationship between changes in net income and accruals in financial accounts.  
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Meanwhile, firms which have experienced losses for several years have also been 
argued to have the tendency to engage in lower financial reporting quality. A study by 
Loebbecke, Eining and Willingham (1989) claimed that poor financial performance 
often causes management to undue emphasis on earnings and profitability, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of financial statement frauds and misstatements. However, 
previous studies have failed to show any significant relationship between firms 
experiencing losses and financial reporting quality. While Beasley (1996) had failed to 
find any significant relationship with financial reporting fraud, Klein (2002b) also failed 
to find any significant relationship between firms experiencing losses for two or more 
consecutive years and abnormal accruals. Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) had also 
failed to find any significant relationship between firms experiencing losses and 
restatement of their financial accounts.  
 
The level of debt has also been argued by past researchers to have an influence on the 
financial reporting quality. In terms of the level of disclosure, Alsaeed (2006) argued 
that higher debt companies have higher agency costs and therefore need to have more 
information disclosed in order to satisfy the needs of creditors for information. A study 
by Craig and Diga (1998) had found a significant positive relationship between debt 
ratio and the level of disclosure, while Alsaeed (2006) had failed to find it significant, 
whereby it was argued that this was probably due to the fact that the creditors may 
have shared private information with their debtors. In contrast, higher leverage 
company is argued to have higher bankruptcy risk, which in turn will lead to litigation 
risk (Rahman and Ali, 2006) and thus, increase management’s tendency to manipulate 
firm financial reporting to overcome this risk. This has been supported by findings by 
Klein (2002b) which showed that a company’s leverage is significantly positively related 
to the level of abnormal accruals. Moreover, a study by Davidson, Stewart and Kent 
(2005) had also found a significant positive relationship between leverage and 
discretionary accruals. However, a subsequent study by Rahman and Ali (2006) and 
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Yang and Krishnan (2005) did not find any significant relationship between company 
leverage and accruals. 
 
Another argument which has been postulated was that the age of a company has a 
positive effect on financial reporting quality. This is based upon arguments that new 
companies may encounter difficulty in making changes to comply with the requirements 
(Abbott, Park and Parker, 2000; Beasley, 1996), meanwhile old firms might have 
improved their financial reporting practices (Alsaeed, 2006). At the same time, younger 
companies have a pressure to boost earnings (Abbott, Park and Parker, 2000).  A 
study by Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) had found support for this contention, 
whereby findings from their study indicated that the number of years a firm has been 
publicly traded is negatively significantly related with the incidence of restatement. 
However, a recent study by Alsaeed (2006) did not find any significant relationship 
between firm age and disclosure level, while another study by Abbott, Park and Parker 
(2000) and Beasley (1996) also failed to find any significant relationship between firm 
age and fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
2.2 Audit Committee in Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms adapted in order to ensure that directors 
and managers make decisions and act in the best interest of the stakeholders (Gillian 
and Starks, 1998; Lashgari, 2004; Thillainathan, 1999). It is concerned with managing 
the relationship among various corporate stakeholders (Lashgari, 2004) and should be 
designed primarily to protect shareholders and creditors (Thillainathan, 1999). The 
wide adoption of audit committee suggests the importance of an audit committee as an 
element in the framework of corporate accountability, where audit committees are 
expected to serve as the guardian of investors’ interests and corporate accountability 
(Zanni and Terrell, 2002). As it comprises of directors from the full board, the formation 
